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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the face of growing concern 
about the pandemic associated 
with COVID-19, Illinois Gov. J.B. 
Pritzker issued Executive Order 
2020-10, which went into effect 
March 21, 2020. The order re-
quired that all individuals must 
stay at home, with exceptions 
for essential activities, essen-
tial government functions, and 
essential businesses and opera-
tions. Gatherings of more than 
10 people were prohibited.1
Stay-at-home orders took 
effect in Indiana and Michigan 
on March 24, just three days 
after Illinois’ order. Wisconsin 
followed on March 25, Kentucky 
on March 26, and Missouri on 
April 6. Iowa has not yet issued 
such an order.2
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Fear of the illness, combined with potential legal 
sanctions resulting from executive actions, led 
to massive economic disruptions in Illinois and 
around the country. Within weeks, the national 
unemployment rate soared from a historic low of 
3.5% to 14.7%. Illinois followed the national pattern 
and saw its unemployment rate increase by 13.3%.3
Of course, stay-at-home orders were only one fac-
tor in the economic disruption. In fact, one recent 
study found that “State-ordered reopenings of 
economies [e.g., lifting of stay-at-home orders] 
have little impact on local employment.”4
There is reason to believe that the economic 
damage may weigh especially heavily on small 
business. Restaurants, bars, bookstores, day care 
centers, hair salons, and most other commercial 
establishments had their economic activities 
greatly restricted.5 Even those that continued to 
operate had to do so in difficult conditions, under 
substantial new constraints. Many consumers 
switched to online purchases, which likely favored 
large businesses with sufficient resources to 
expand existing web-based platforms or quickly 
develop new ones.6
This report provides some preliminary evidence 
about how small businesses in Illinois fared in 
comparison to their Midwestern neighbors in 
Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky Michigan, Missouri, and 
Wisconsin.
There is little evidence that Illinois’ experience was 
distinctive compared to its Midwestern neighbors, 
despite differences in the timing or intensity of 
states’ stay-at-home orders. Instead, there are similar 
patterns across each of the states examined here. 
Analysis of small businesses comparing Illinois 
border counties with their neighbors can be 
especially instructive since government policies 
change discretely along state borders, but the 
prevalence of COVID-19 infections generally does 
not. Our analyses reveal substantial heterogene-
ity, but overall revenue of small business in Illi-
nois border counties was similar to revenue from 
businesses located in counties across the state 
line in adjacent states. This analysis of bordering 
counties also did not detect any differences in the 
proportions of Illinois and non-Illinois businesses 
that remained open.
At a time when the steps taken by government 
are increasingly facing pushback, there is also 
little evidence that the states’ very different ap-
proaches to public safety were a significant driver 
of small business economic distress. Consumer 
fears, rather than governmental actions, appear to 
account for much of the economic disruption.
INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic brought widespread 
health, social and economic hardship to households 
and businesses across the state, the nation, and the 
world. Public health experts, economists, govern-
ment officials, and many others will be studying this 
episode for decades to come with the hope of un-
covering lessons that will provide valuable guidance 
for future responses to public health crises.
This report provides an initial look at some early 
evidence regarding one element of COVID-19’s 
economic challenges by conducting comparative 
analysis of small business conditions in Illinois and 
neighboring states.
It is fortunate that a number of novel high-fre-
quency and relevant data sources have become 
available to shed insight on the economic distress 
of small businesses at a state and sub-state level. 
The analysis in this report relies primarily on two 
data sources: The U.S. Census Bureau’s Small 
Business Pulse Survey (SBPS) and Opportunity 
Insights Economic Tracker (Tracker Data).7
Each small business respondent to the SBPS is 
asked a series of 15 questions. This report focuses 
on just two of these questions.
1. Overall, how has this business been affected 
by the COVID-19 pandemic? A. Large negative 
effect, B. Moderate negative effect, C. Little or 
no effect, D. Moderate positive effect, E. Large 
positive effect
2. How would you describe the current availability 
of cash on hand for this business, including any 
financial assistance or loans? Currently, cash on 
hand will cover: A. 1-7 days of business oper-
ations, B. 1-2 weeks of business operations, C. 
3-4 weeks of business operations, D. 1-2 months 
of business operations, E. 3 or more months of 
business operations, F. No cash available for 
business operations, G. Don’t know.
Opportunity Insights provides data from Womply, 
which aggregates data from credit card processors.8 
This report uses two variables from that data:
1. merchants_all: Percent change in number of 
small businesses open, calculated as a 7-day 
moving average, seasonally adjusted, and in-
dexed to Jan. 4-31, 2020; and,

















































































Figure 1: Percent of businesses that reported the pandemic had a moderate or large negative effect, by 
state and week
Week 1 began April 26, 2020. Week 9 began June 21, 2020. Dashed vertical lines indicate the date the stay-at-home order 
was relaxed. All states except Iowa issued a stay-at-home order before April 26. Iowa had not issued a stay-at-home order 
as of Oct. 12, 2020. Kentucky did not lift its stay-at-home order until June 29, 2020. Sources: U.S. Census Bureau Small 
Business Pulse Survey and Ballotpedia.
2. revenue_all: Percent change in net revenue for 
small businesses, calculated as a 7-day moving 
average, seasonally adjusted, and indexed to 
Jan. 4-31, 2020.
Both data sources provide very timely data and 
significant geographic disaggregation. This re-
port uses weekly state level data from SBPS and 
daily county-level Tracker Data to better under-
stand comparative economic impacts on small 
business.
THE COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS OF THE PANDEMIC ON 
SMALL BUSINESS IN ILLINOIS
Responses to the census survey
Perhaps the simplest way to answer this question 
is to consider SBPS respondents’ self-assess-
ment, as summarized in Question 1 above, across 
several Midwest states. 
Figure 1 presents this evidence. It also depicts 
a dotted vertical (red) line on the date stay-at-
home orders were relaxed in each state, except 
Iowa, which never issued a stay-at-home order, 
and Kentucky, which did not lift its stay-at-home 
order until June 29, 2020, after the SBPS data 
was collected. Similarly, Indiana lifted its shut-
down order at the beginning of the period shown 
in Figure 1, on May 4.9
More than 90% of Week 1 Illinois respondents 
said that the pandemic had a moderate or large 
negative effect on their business. This was similar 
to the national (U.S.) share but somewhat higher 
than other states in the region with the exception 
of Michigan. 
Over the next eight weeks, the share of Illinois re-
spondents with such a negative response gradual-
ly declined and approximated the national aver-
age, but remained somewhat higher than other 
states, except Michigan. In the ninth week, which 
began June 21, there was a slight uptick in very 
negative responses in Illinois that was mirrored 
in Kentucky and Missouri but not nationally or in 
other states in the region.
While a comprehensive analysis of this ques-
tion is not possible with currently available data, 
the answers to Question 2 (above) of the SBPS 
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survey—the amount of cash on hand—do provide 
one important indicator of the precariousness of a 
small business’ long-term viability.
Figure 2 summarizes data for the same group of 
states. It gives the percentage of small business 
respondents in each state that reported having four 
weeks or more of cash on hand. With this question, a 
higher number is better than a lower number.
In Week 1 of the SBPS shown above, a slightly 
smaller share of Illinois respondents reported four 
weeks or more of cash on hand compared to the 
U.S. as a whole and several other states in the re-
gion. Illinois businesses more closely mirror those 
in Kentucky and Indiana. 
Over time, the share of Illinois and national re-
spondents with this level of cash on hand in-
creased until Week 5 (May 31 through June 6), 
after which it fell slightly and then plateaued. 
By Week 9, which started June 21, the 55% of Illi-
nois respondents reporting four or more weeks of 
cash on hand was similar to the national average 
and the share in Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, and 
Wisconsin. Illinois’ 55% was slightly above the share 
in Iowa and slightly below the share in Michigan.
To summarize: The data from the SBFS survey, 
which reports small business’ self-assessment of 
the pandemic’s economic impact, suggest that 
the effect in Illinois has moderated somewhat over 
time and is quite similar to the impact nationally 
and among neighboring states. 
There is little evidence that variation in the dates 
and stringency of the stay-at-home orders had 
a significant effect on the pandemic’s economic 
impact on small business.
Responses to the Opportunity Insights 
data
The Tracker Data from Opportunity Insights has 
some advantages and some disadvantages com-
pared to the SBFS data. 
It is based on data about the actual credit card 
revenue received by the business, which may 
provide a more objective measure than subjec-
tive survey responses. In addition, these data 
are available daily and for many U.S. counties. 


















































































Figure 2: Percent of businesses that reported four weeks or more of cash on hand, by state and week
Week 1 began April 26, 2020. Week 9 began June 21, 2020. Dashed vertical lines indicate the date the stay-at-home order 
was relaxed. All states except Iowa issued a stay-at-home order before April 26. Iowa had not issued a stay-at-home order 
as of Oct. 12, 2020. Kentucky did not lift its stay-at-home order until June 29, 2020. Sources: U.S. Census Bureau Small 
Business Pulse Survey and Ballotpedia.
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On the other hand, Tracker Data 
reflect only a narrow slice of 
current economic activity and 
may not reflect broad economic 
conditions and judgments the 
way survey responses can.10 
This report provides two sets of 
data analyses using the Tracker 
Data. First, this report presents 
the effect of stay-at-home orders 
on small business activity. It com-
pares the number of open small 
businesses and revenue in Cook 
County, Illinois (which includes 
Chicago) and collar counties to 
small business revenue and the 
number of open small businesses 
in Marion County, Indiana (which 
includes Indianapolis) and sur-
rounding counties.
Secondly, we compare small 
business’ status as opened or 
closed and revenue in 15 Illinois 
border counties with their adja-
cent counties around the state 
line for a number of states in 
the region.
Small business activity in 
Chicago and Indianapolis
Figure 3 presents data on the 
share of small businesses that 
were open (i.e., had positive 
revenue) during each day of the 
period from Jan. 1 to early June 
of 2020 in Cook and Illinois 
counties surrounding Chica-
go. Figure 4 presents similar 
information for Marion and 
Indiana counties surrounding 
Indianapolis. 
Cook and all the Illinois collar 
counties suffered a precipitous 
decline in the share of business-
es that were open beginning in 
early March and continuing into 
early April, when the number of 
open small businesses stabi-
lized at a much lower level. 
County-level daily data in this 
analysis demonstrate that the 
number of open small business-
es had begun to decline signifi-
cantly prior to Gov. Pritzker’s 
stay-at-home order on March 21. 
Each of the counties recovered 
somewhat as time progressed, 
but all remained into early June 
far below their January 2020 
levels.
Data on counties in the India-
napolis area show somewhat 
similar patterns, but the early 
March decline in the number of 
open small businesses is less 
precipitous in Indiana. The total 





























Merchants_all: Percent change in a number of small businesses open calculated 
as a 7-day moving average, seasonally adjusted, and indexed to Jan. 4-31, 2020. 
Illinois’ stay-at-home order expired on May 29, 2020. Source: Chetty, et al., 2020 
(see endnote 4) and Ballotpedia.






































Indiana stay-at-home order lifted May 1, 2020. Merchants_all: Percent change 
in a number of small businesses open calculated as a 7-day moving average, 
seasonally adjusted, and indexed to Jan. 4-31, 2020. Source: Chetty, et al., 2020 
(see endnote 4).
magnitude of the decline and 
the amount of recovery through 
early June are similar across the 
two states.
Figures 5 and 6 present small 
business revenue rather than 
open businesses. All Illinois 
county patterns are similar to 
one another (see Figure 5), with 
precipitous declines in early 
March. 
The more than 40% decline in 
Illinois small business revenue is 
even greater than the decline in 
the number of open merchants, 
and the recoveries were of a 
smaller magnitude. 
Revenue declines in counties 
surrounding Indianapolis also 
started in early March and were 
also very large. In many instanc-
es, these declines were even 
larger than the declines in the 
Chicago area. There had been, 
at best, a modest recovery in 
the Indianapolis area through 
early June. 
Small business activity in 
Illinois border counties
Thirty-nine Illinois counties 
share a border with one or 
more other states. To the extent 
that state policies influence the 
pandemic’s economic effects 
on small businesses, these 
counties can be especially 
instructive. State policies may 
change discretely at state bor-
ders, but the prevalence of the 
COVID-19 infection is unlikely to 
change dramatically. 
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Revenue_all: Percent change in net revenue for small businesses, calculated as 
a 7-day moving average, seasonally adjusted, and indexed to Jan. 4-31, 2020. 
Chetty, et al., 2020 (see endnote 4).































Illinois stay-at-home order relaxed May 26, 2020. Revenue_all: Percent change 
in net revenue for small businesses, calculated as a 7-day moving average, 
seasonally adjusted, and indexed to Jan. 4-31, 2020. Source: Chetty, et al., 2020 
(see endnote 4).
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The Tracker Data provide coun-
ty-level information about the 
number of merchants that are 
open and merchant revenues 
for counties on either side of 
the Illinois state line. Specifical-
ly, this report compares 15 of 
Illinois’ border counties with the 
corresponding county in an ad-
jacent state with longest border 
to the Illinois county. 
Figures 7 through 10 display the 
ratio of open merchants over 
time in Illinois counties that 
border Indiana, Missouri, Iowa, 
and Wisconsin. There was insuf-
ficient data to study counties 
that border Kentucky.11 
In these graphs, a value great-
er than one—above the dotted 
line—indicates that a greater 
share of merchants in the Illinois 
county were open, compared to 
a baseline number of business-
es,12 than in the border county. 
The data are volatile over time 
and varies across counties 
and states. However, the three 
figures show that prior to early 
March, Illinois border counties 
often had a smaller share of 
open merchants when com-
pared to their bordering county. 
Later in the period, from about 
early April, most Illinois counties 
appeared to perform as well, or 
better, than their border part-
ners. No clear state-to-state 
patterns emerge.
Figures 11 to 14 examine revenue 
rather than the share of open 
merchants and compare Illinois 
counties to those that border 
them. 
The results are generally quite 
similar, although Illinois counties 
that border Missouri (see Figure 
12 for Adams, Jackson, Madison 
and Monroe) and two of those 
that border Wisconsin (see Fig-
ure 14 for Lake and Stephenson) 
performed less well than their 
border counterparts did after 
April. On the other hand, small 





































Seven-day moving average of ratio of merchants_all in Illinois and border county. 
Values greater than 3 or less than -3 are truncated. Source: Chetty, et al., 2020 
(see endnote 4).






























Seven-day moving average of ratio of merchants_all in Illinois and border county. 
Values greater than 3 or less than -3 are truncated. Source: Chetty, et al., 2020 
(see endnote 4).
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businesses in St. Clair County 
seemed to do better than their 
neighboring county in Missouri. 
Businesses in Boone and Win-
nebago counties seemed to do 
better than neighboring coun-
ties in Wisconsin at least during 
the end of the period. Rock 
Island and Whiteside county 
businesses also were outper-
forming their border counties 
in Iowa toward the end of the 
period.
CONCLUSION
Evidence presented here 
demonstrates that the 
COVID-19 pandemic had ma-
jor negative impacts on small 
businesses in Illinois and neigh-
boring states. 
The vast majority of business-
es reported a moderate or 
large negative impact from the 
pandemic. That impact moder-
ated somewhat over time but 
remained severe even in late 
June. Many small businesses 
had only a few weeks of cash 
on hand early in the pandemic 
and that improved only grad-
ually. Many small businesses 
were forced to close, at least 
temporarily, and small business 
revenue plummeted. 





































average of ratio of 
merchants_all in 
Illinois and border 
county. Values 
greater than 3 or 
less than -3 are 
truncated. Source: 
Chetty, et al., 2020 
(See endnote 4).
Figure 9: Illinois counties that border Iowa













































Seven-day moving average of ratio of merchants_all in Illinois and border county. 
Values greater than 3 or less than -3 are truncated. Source: Chetty, et al., 2020 
(see endnote 4).
Seven-day moving average of ratio of revenue_all in Illinois and border county. 
Values greater than 3 or less than -3 are truncated. Source: Chetty, et al., 2020 
(see endnote 4).
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Figure 12: Illinois counties that border Missouri
Figure 13: Illinois counties that border Iowa
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Seven-day moving average of ratio of revenue_all in Illinois and border county. 
Values greater than 3 or less than -3 are truncated. Source: Chetty, et al., 2020 
(see endnote 4).
Seven-day moving average of ratio of revenue_all in Illinois and border county. 
Values greater than 3 or less than -3 are truncated. Source: Chetty, et al., 2020 
(see endnote 4).
Seven-day moving average of ratio of revenue_all in Illinois and border county. Values greater than 3 or less than -3 are 
truncated. Source: Chetty, et al., 2020 (see endnote 4).
We see similar patterns be-
tween Illinois and each of its 
neighboring states and there is 
little evidence that states’ stay-
at-home orders were a signifi-
cant predictor of the negative 
economic outcomes for small 
business.
Of course, the data currently 
available only provide informa-
tion about short-term impacts 
and may not capture impacts 
on the full range of small 
businesses. 
The pandemic’s economic im-
pact is driven by many factors 
including the incidence of the 
disease, pre-existing economic 
and structural conditions, and 
public policies. However, more 
study is needed before eco-
nomic effects on small business 
can be attributed to any single 
cause.
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We are honored to have the opportunity to harness our 
collective research and experience to serve our neighbors and 
the residents of Illinois during a time of great need.
Respectfully submitted,
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